Book: The Political Logic of Poverty Relief: Electoral Strategies and Social Policy in Mexico (2016, Cambridge University Press, co-authored with Alberto Diaz-Cayeros and Federico Estévez)

The Political Logic of Poverty Relief places elections and institutional design at the core of poverty alleviation. The authors develop a theory with applications to Mexico about how elections shape social programs aimed at aiding the poor. Would political parties possess incentives to target the poor with transfers aimed at poverty alleviation or would they instead give these to their supporters? Would politicians rely on the distribution of particularistic benefits rather than public goods? The authors assess the welfare effects of social programs in Mexico and whether voters reward politicians for targeted poverty alleviation programs. The book provides a new interpretation of the role of cash transfers and poverty relief assistance in the development of welfare state institutions."

Public Good Provision and Traditional Governance in Indigenous Communities in Oaxaca, Mexico, Comparative Political Studies, 2019
"Aiding Latin America's Poor." Journal of Democracy 20, no. 4 (2009): 36-49 (with Alberto Diaz-Cayeros).
"Partisan Cleavages, State Retrenchment, and Free Trade: Latin America in the 1990s." Latin American Research Review 43, no. 2 (2008): 107-135 (with Vidal Romero).

Selected Book Chapters
"Clientelism and portfolio diversification: a model of electoral investment with applications to Mexico." Patrons, clients, and policies: Patterns of democratic accountability and political competition (2007): 182-205 (with Alberto Diaz-Cayeros and Federico Estévez).
"Welfare Benefits, Canvassing and Campaign Handouts." (2006) in Jorge Domínguez, Chappell Lawson, and Alejandro Moreno (2006) Consolidating Mexico’s Democracy. Johns Hopkins University Press (with Alberto Diaz-Cayeros and Federico Estévez.)